Analysis of the impact of peer pressures on workplace behaviour
Compensation scheme can be represented:
W is guaranteed wage b is a piece rate based on the number of units of output e and K is a constant term to satisfy the individual rationality. Situation is presented in Fig.4 2 Low ability workers have steep indifference curves additional effort must be compensated by a large increase in income, flatter indifference curves are those for higher ability workers hourly wage function starts at zero becomes vertical at e 0 and then horizontal at point A. If the workers are offered an hourly wage schedule everyone chooses point A since there is lower utility working at higher levels of effort.
High ability workers chose to move from A to B (the tangent point of the budget line and the indifference curve) when piece rate schedule is introduced. Switch in compensation scheme leads to increase in average ability and productivity of workforce and has sorting effect of recruitment of high quality workers, and variance of worker ability to output increases. In table 2 dependent variable is log of (Output per worker per day) there are 29837 observations. Overall productivity increased about 44% (an increase in the log of 0.368) as a result from switch from the hourly wage contract to a piece rate and the equation for interpretation is exp of 2 0.368 is 1, 44 and that -1 is 0.44*100=44%.Second parameter is an increase of output for a given worker after the switch to a piece rates occurred. This is a log increase of 0.197 or interpretation as previous coefficient with antilog as 22% increase in productivity for average worker. The coefficient before the dummy for workers hired after the piece rate has been implemented is significant; with size 0.243 log showing how higher their productivity is compared with the workers working in hourly wage scheme. The results from Table 5 show that workers who are or have potential to be in a piece rate range experienced an average increase in output of 0.55 units. Those who never reached piece rate range experienced an increase in output of 0.32 units. The output of these workers increased conditional on the high ability workers decision, otherwise we define as peer pressure effect.
Analysis of Lazear and Shaw (2007) model for compensation structures within firms
In fig.1 3 is compared Paying for input versus paying for output. Without measuring the individual output (q) firm pays wage 1 which is the mean of output across the all workers, after incurring fixed measurement costs, the firm pays all the individuals the distribution of wages labelled wage, if the firm does not bear this measurement costs, the best workers in area A will leave the firm for other firms that do measure their output. Also important are the questions how should firms avoid losing "star" workers what is their structure pay for optimal retention of workers. Assume that the workers have output q that varies across the workers in a typical bell shaped curve distribution. Each individual's output is unknown to the firm, because output is costly to measure, output however can be measured at some cost. The firm can forego the measurement, in which case no measurement cost is incurred and no information about workers ability is revealed. So, firm pays a straight salary, which must equal the average output. The firm also can measure the output of its employees and pay workers according to their individual output, which can be called "pay for performance". The distribution of pay matches the distribution of output minus the measurement costs. First implication of the model is that firm will pay for performance when it is cheaper to measure performance, good workers will want their output to be measured. In figure 1workers that are in part A will leave the firm if the firm pays an average wage rather than using pay for performance. The cost of measuring output is decreasing over time due to decreasing technologies. Second implication of this model is when a worker has an alternative high paying jobs, it is important for the firm to pay the worker for what they produce or the firm will lose worker. Third implication is as the lower the tail of distribution of worker quality gets larger, performance pay is more likely to be optimal. Also paying for performance induces people to work harder. Workers with high disutility of effort relative to their output will avoid firms that pay for performance. Performance pay is used to induce selection by workers into the right jobs. Also pay for individuals should have less variance than the output. Pay compression is a part of optimal contracts; finally pay compression can be used to insure workers against uncertain outcomes.
3. What "positive productivity spillover "? Assess the evidence concerning the existence and size of such spillovers provided by Mas and Moretti .
The introduction of a high productivity worker can increase productivity of incumbent workers as a result of peer effects and it could worsen sometimes because of the free riding effect. This is positive productivity spillover. The spillover is large for workers with above average productivity and small for workers below average productivity Individual specific spillover is a monotonic decreasing function of a worker skill level. The aim is to investigate how workers in a team will react exogenous change in the productivity what is workers utility working in teams where the last part of the equation is a peer pressure. In the baseline model workers productivity at a given moment of time varies as a function of average permanent productivity we marked permanent co-worker productivity as this permanent co-worker's productivities are estimated holding constant co-workers composition and therefore do not reflect spillovers. Second regressed are the 10 minute changes in individual productivity on changes in is the number of active workers in each 10 minute interval at the relevant store, and is a set of dummies for each day of the week * 10 minute period *store combination .The dependent variable is change in log productivity of worker i. The term is the change in average permanent productivity of i's worker from t-1 to t. In table 6 4 the first column shows that 10 % increase in co-workers productivity is associated with 1.8% increase in reference worker productivity. This finding indicates that positive spillovers appear to dominate any free riding effect. Entry of a worker with above average permanent productivity is associated with a 1.1%
increase in productivity of co-worker. The exit of an above average co-worker leads to a 0.5% decline in a productivity relative to the exit of below average co-worker. When a high productivity worker starts a shift, the productivity of other workers rises of about 0.6%, when a high productivity worker ends shift the productivity of other workers falls by 0.6%. Column 6 in table 2 shows that most of the spillover effects benefits the productivity of low productivity workers, but high productivity workers are not reducing their productivity in presence of low productivity workers. This finding is important because of its implications for optimal mixing of last table) 6 See Appendix 2 0.7%. Table 7   7 on the other hand there are shown estimates of the equation ,The point estimate is virtually zero, meaning that the changes in the permanent productivity of co-workers who have had little previous overlap with ,have no effect on the change of productivity form t-1 to t. Denotes low schedule overlap M, denotes medium schedule overlap. And overlap means interactions. And changes in the permanent productivity of co-workers with medium and high previous overlap have positive and statistically significant relationship with changes in i's contemporaneous productivity. The entire spillover effect comes from changes in the composition of workers for whom i is the light of sight. The important finding in table 6 was that there is a relationship between changes in the permanent productivity of i's workers and contemporaneous productivity depending on the spatial orientation of the co-workers in relation with i. In column 3 table 7, we test whether changes in the presence of co-workers, irrespective of their permanent productivity affects i's productivity depending on whether these co-workers have high, medium or low previous overlap with i ,as well as the spatial orientation of these coworkers in relation to i. It has been found that changes in the presence of a co-worker in front of i has either no effect ,or negative effect on i's productivity. Workers with low schedule overlap with i, their entry is not associated with a statistically significant change in i's productivity. As conclusions from these findings it is important that mix of high and low productivity workers is optimal.
5.Summary
Switch in compensation scheme (from guaranteed fixed wage to piece rate) leads to increase in average ability and productivity of workforce and has sorting effect of recruitment of high quality workers, and variance of worker ability to output increases. Workers with high disutility of effort relative to their output will avoid firms that pay for performance. Performance pay is used to induce selection by workers into the right jobs. Also pay for individuals should have less variance than the output. Pay compression is a part of optimal contracts; finally pay compression can be used to insure workers against uncertain outcomes. The introduction of a high productivity worker can increase productivity of incumbent workers as a result of peer effects and it could worsen sometimes because of the free riding effect. Most of the spillover effects benefits the productivity of low productivity workers, but high productivity workers are not reducing their productivity in presence of low productivity workers. Three possible causes of existence of spillovers are: Social pressure, contagious enthusiasm, knowledge spillovers.
Appendix 1
Paying for input versus paying for output Table 6 The effect of changes of average co-worker permanent productivity on reference person current productivity ;Models by spatial orientation and proximity 
